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COMMENT
OUT OF BOUNDS: TIME TO REVAMP
TEXAS SPORTS AGENT LEGISLATION
by T Andrew Dow
AST month, the Indianapolis Colts signed their number one draft
choice, University of Illinois quarterback Jeff George, to a record six-
year, $15 million contract.I As the recently concluded 1990 amateur
sports drafts approached, talented high school and college athletes undoubt-
edly pondered those numbers with amazement. Unassumingly thrust into
the reality of professional sports, many questions must come to a young ath-
lete's mind. How does he ensure that he receives his fair market value?
What does he do with all that money once he receives it? In addition, be-
cause a young athlete probably lacks business sophistication, other questions
likely do not come to mind. How does he structure a contract in a manner
that will minimize tax liability? Where does he find commercial endorse-
ments that will supplement his salary?
Enter the sports agent, a phenomenon of the late twentieth century. On
one hand, sports agents have been called the "most destructive force in
sports."' 2 On the other hand, sports agents have been characterized as serv-
ing the necessary function of equalizing the relationship between the athletes
they represent and the management of the teams with whom they negotiate.3
Where lies the balance between these countervailing views? The National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)4 and various professional players'
associations5 have attempted to strike it. They have found, however, that
I. The Dallas Morning News, April 21, 1990, at I IB, col. 1.
2. INQUIRY INTO PROFESSIONAL SPORTS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON PROFESSIONAL SPORTS, H.R. REP. No. 1786, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1977) [hereinafter
REPORT] (statement of Harrison Vickers, Owner of the Houston Aeros).
3. Inquiry into Professional Sports, 1976." Hearings Before the House Select Committee on
Professional Sports, Part One, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 282 (1976) [hereinafter Hearings] (testi-
mony of Martin Blackman, agent); id. at 285 (testimony of Jerry Kapstein, agent).
4. Memorandum from Richard J. Evrard, Director of NCAA Legislative Services, to
Player Agents (Sept. 1, 1987) [hereinafter NCAA Letter] (discussing 1987-88 Player Agent
Registration Program), noted in Kohn, Sports Agents Representing Athletes.- Being Certified
Means Never Having to Say You're Qualified, 6 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 18 n.58 (1988).
5. For a discussion and analysis of the certification and registration of agents by the
National Football League Player's Association (NFLPA), the National Basketball Player's
Association (NBPA), and the Major League Baseball Player's Association (MLBPA), see
Kohn, supra note 4, at 7-9.
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their limited jurisdictional reach impairs their attempts to curb the broad
range of misdealings of unscrupulous agents. 6 As a result, as many as seven-
teen states have enacted legislation aimed at the regulation of sports agent
activity. 7 This Comment first discusses the historical developments that
prompted the need for such representation and then examines the metamor-
phosis of the agent's role over the past twenty years. The Comment also
focuses on the various attempts to regulate the industry, with a particular
emphasis on Texas legislation. In analyzing the Texas law the Comment
makes recommendations to increase the scope and effectiveness of the statute
as well as remove any constitutional concerns that may exist. Finally, the
Comment examines the federal regulation alternative.
I. BACKGROUND
The prominence of the sports agent is a relatively recent development in
the world of sports. As recently as twenty years ago most players negotiated
their own contracts.8 Two primary reasons explain the late arrival of the
agent into professional sports: first, until the past couple of decades the ath-
lete had no bargaining power to use as leverage with the team with whom he
was dealing; and second, even if he did, professional sports were not as popu-
lar nor as profitable as they are today.9 From a strict market analysis, there-
fore, the industry until recently could not have survived today's multi-
million dollar contracts or the factors that led to them.
A. Factors Increasing the Bargaining Power of Athletes
Several events took place in the 1960s and 1970s that shifted the strength
in contract negotiations to the players. First, the creation of new profes-
sional leagues gave players a workable alternative to the previous sole option
of simply refusing to play.' 0 By choosing to jump leagues a player could, in
effect, hold out for as long as needed and still be paid a handsome salary
while doing so." At the same time he was able to continue playing the
sport, even if in an inferior league. 12
The expanded competition for the players' services and the resulting bar-
gaining leverage paid off in areas other than increased compensation. This
6. See infra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
8. G. SCHUBERT, R. SMITH & J. TRENTADUE, SPORTS LAW 123 (1986) [hereinafter
SPORTS LAW].
9. Id.
10. Since the 1960's the National Football League (NFL) has been the most challenged
professional league with competition from the American (AFL), World (WFL), and United
States (USFL) Football Leagues. In other sports, competition for players also arose among the
National (NBA) and American (ABA) Basketball Associations, as well as the National
Hockey League (NHL) and the World Hockey Association (WHA). While none of the upstart
leagues ever survived as a viable alternative to the more established alliances, they did succeed
in increasing the bargaining power of the players and driving up salaries. For a discussion of
competition among professional sports leagues, see L. SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS AND
THE LAW 331-419 (1977) & Supp. 61-68 (1981).




shift in negotiating power, for instance, helped transform the players' as-
sociations from meaningless organizations into powerful labor unions 13 that
were able to dilute or abolish the option and reserve clauses present in prac-
tically every contract.' 4 Perhaps more significantly, the players' unions be-
gan to realize the objectives that could be accomplished through the
collective bargaining process. Through collective bargaining, for example,
the experienced players obtained the right of free agency,' 5 and the younger
players obtained the benefits of increased minimum salaries and arbitra-
tion. 16 Furthermore, the average yearly salaries in each of the major sports
skyrocketed. 17
B. Factors Leading to the Increased Popularity and Profitability of Sports
Expanded media exposure, enhanced by the increased availability of ra-
dios and televisions in the home, significantly contributed to the rise in popu-
larity of spectator sports in America."8 With the popularity of these events
came high television ratings, which led to increased revenues from network,
pay, and cable television contracts.' 9 These contracts, along with the adver-
tising and commercial activities they foster, have transformed the sports in-
dustry into a multi-billion dollar a year trade.20 As a result, franchise
owners are financially capable of meeting the increasing salary demands of
the players and their unions, and they have demonstrated an acquiescence,
albeit grudgingly, to pay the inflated salaries. 2'
These factors increased the bargaining power of the athlete, as well as the
13. Sobel, The Regulation of Sports Agents: An Analytical Primer, 39 BAYLOR L. REV.
701, 704 (1987).
14. Id. These clauses precluded athletes from negotiating with any other team in the
same professional league. For a discussion of the effect of these clauses on the bargaining
position of the individual athlete, see SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 124.
15. Free agency allows a veteran player without a current contract to declare himself a
free agent and enter the marketplace by making his services available to other teams in the
league. The result is usually a bidding war between various teams and a higher salary for the
player. SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 125.
16. Id. For example, the MLBPA has bargained successfully for the current minimum
salary of $68,000 and mandatory arbitration after three years in the league. Fichtenbaum,
Rosenblatt & Sandomir, How Golden the Goose, SPORTS, INC., Jan. 2, 1989, at 29 [hereinafter
How Golden].
17. Id. The average salary in Major League Baseball, for example, has risen from $19,000
in 1967 to $438,000 in 1988. How Golden, supra note 16, at 29. Furthermore, no end to this
pattern appears imminent. Just last year, the average player salary in the NFL rose to
$302,000, a 27.6% increase over 1988. King, Inside the NFL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 18,
1989, at 68.
18. SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 126.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Considerable debate has arisen over whether the owners will be able to continue to
meet the increasing salaries. To this point, the owners have passed some of this expense on to
the fans, who are willing to pay higher prices for tickets. It is unclear, however, whether the
fans will continue to acquiesce. The NBA, in addressing this concern, established a compli-
cated salary cap system by which each team is given a maximum amount to spend on players'
salaries. For a general discussion of this salary cap and the antitrust issues it raises, see Note,




popularity and profitability of the sports world, and contributed to the crea-
tion of an environment in which an individual athlete could no longer afford
to negotiate his own contract. 22 The stakes of the game having been raised,
most athletes realized the need to hire a professional in order to reap the
benefits of this increased leverage. 23
C. Services Performed by the Agent
Like the sports industry itself, the services performed by sports agents
have undergone considerable change from the early days of mere contract
negotiation. As the contracts of the athletes grow more sophisticated, so do
the services agents provide. Thus, agents have become contract advisors and
negotiators, financial advisors and mangers, marketing consultants, and even
legal and tax counselors. 24 This transformation into the concept of full ser-
vice representation has broadened the agents' role and increased the areas of
expertise they must possess. Not all agents perform all of these services, but
the concept of the sports agent necessarily has been expanded to include
each of them.25 Broadly defined, sports agents provide three distinct
services.
1. Contract Negotiation
The oldest and perhaps the most significant service of an agent involves
the negotiation of a player's employment agreement. 26 While the past
twenty years have shown a dramatic shift in bargaining power from the own-
ership and management of teams to the players, most players personally lack
the business sophistication to take advantage of this power. 27 The agent,
therefore, serves as "the great equalizer" in the process of negotiation. 28 In-
equity inherently exists in a negotiation between an experienced team official
and a young man directly out of high school or college. In theory, therefore,
an agent representing the athlete serves to turn a potentially one-sided nego-
tiation into an arms-length dealing. 29
The agent's representation in the contractual relationship requires not
only expertise in the art of negotiation but also an understanding of complex
legal and tax matters. 30 A working knowledge of these matters is essential
for quality representation and the maximization of benefits to the agent's
client.31 Needless to say, such broad expertise in an agent is difficult to come
by.
22. SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 124.
23. Id. at 126.
24. Ehrhardt & Rodgers, Tightening the Defense Against Offensive Sports Agents, 16 FLA.
ST. U.L. REV. 633, 638-39 (1988) [hereinafter Ehrhardt].
25. Id.
26. Sobel, supra note 13, at 705.
27. REPORT, supra note 2, at 71.
28. Hearings, supra note 3, at 282 (testimony of Martin Blackman, agent).
29. Id.





After completing the task of contract negotiation, the athlete bears the
burden of managing a large income. Realizing this, many opportunistic
agents act as financial consultants and income managers to the athletes they
represent. 32 Prudent agents, aware that professional athletes have a limited
career span, will place the athlete's income in financially sound investments
with the goal of long-term financial security.33 As in the negotiation pro-
cess, accomplishment of this goal requires the agent's knowledge of legal and
tax issues. 34
3. Marketing
Commercial endorsements and public appearances provide today's ath-
letes with income opportunities in addition to employment contracts and
investments. 35 Some agents, therefore, have taken it upon themselves to so-
licit such opportunities on behalf of their clients. 36 If marketed properly, a
talented athlete can significantly increase his yearly income through a vari-
ety of activities that commercially capitalize on his name and reputation.
Furthermore, unlike the more traditional services provided by the agent, this
assistance may last well into an athlete's retirement.
D. Types of Agent Misconduct
Two general categories describe the most common forms of agent mis-
dealing: incompetency and unscrupulousness. The latter represents the
most publicized failing of the industry, but is no more damaging to the client
than the former.
1. Incompetency
As mentioned earlier, sports representation has evolved from mere con-
tract negotiation into a full service industry whereby agents have become
financial advisors and planners, securities brokers, marketing consultants,
and legal and tax counselors. 37 Obviously, very few individuals have exper-
tise in all of these areas, and many agents have no.experience in any of
them.38 Realizing a lack of expertise in a certain field, many agents will, in
the best interest of their clients, seek out professionals to perform some of
these services. Greed, however, prevents some from soliciting aid because
such fastidiousness results in lower fees in their pockets. Furthermore, they
are competing against other agents who offer a prospective client a full range
of services. If the agent is honest and manifests a lack of knowledge in a
32. SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 132.
33. Sobel, supra note 13, at 708.
34. Id. at 709.
35. Ehrhardt, supra note 24, at 638-39.
36. Id.
37. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
38. For a general discussion of incompetency among agents, see J. WEISTART & C. Low-
ELL, THE LAW OF SPORTS 319-21 (1979) [hereinafter J. WEISTART].
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certain area, he will not be as attractive to a prospective client as the less-
than-honest agent who purports to be a master of all trades.
2. Unscrupulous Dealings
The potential for dishonorable dealings among agents begins long before
an agent has ever signed a contract with an athlete. Certainly, the most
pronounced misdealing of agents has been the illegal recruitment of clients
off college campuses.3 9 In 1987 widespread revelations of illegal payoffs and
inducements to sign athletes rocked the sports world40 and triggered an out-
break of state regulation aimed at protecting the athletes and their respective
colleges or universities. 41
Once an athlete signs an agreement with an agent, the potential for abuse
still exists. The next step in the relationship involves the negotiation of the
athlete's employment contract with a particular club and, in this context, an
agent's lack of ethics or general incompetence begins to affect the player in a
material way.42 Players' associations have tried to limit the potential appli-
cation of unconscionable fees that an agent may charge a naive athlete. For
example, both the National Football League Players Association (NFLPA)
and the National Basketball Players Association (NBPA) have set a limit on
the maximum percentage of the athlete's contract that the agent may re-
ceive. Both also prohibit the agent from receiving his fee until the player
receives the compensation upon which the fee was based.43 As a result,
agents sometimes negotiate for terms that insure they are paid immediately,
regardless of the long-term financial and tax consequences such terms may
have on the athlete.44
The potential for abuse remains in the post-contract negotiation relation-
39. Another ruse implemented in the past involves an agent misleading an organization
into believing that he represents a particular athlete when he in fact does not. The agent then
will negotiate a deal with the club and use the offer from the club as an inducement to lure the
athlete into a management contract. Id. at 320.
40. Revealed was the determination of certain agents to sign college athletes to premature
agency contracts in knowing violation of NCAA rules. The agents solicited these agreements
with substantial cash and other tangible benefits. The major players in these revelations were
Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom, a.k.a. World Sports & Entertainment, Inc., and Jim Aberne-
thy, an Altanta-based agent. These three paid out hundreds of thousands of dollars in illegal
inducements. The NCAA declared at least twelve college players ineligible for all or part of
their senior seasons as a result of signing premature agency contracts. For a discussion on the
dealings of these three and their subsequent indictments, see Ehrhart, supra note 24, at 643-49.
41. For a discussion of state regulation of sports agents, see infra notes 57-58 and accom-
panying text.
42. SPORTS LAW, supra note 8, at 137.
43. For details of the complex fee limitations, see NFLPA REGULATIONS GOVERNING
CONTRACT ADVISORS § 4C (1983) [hereinafter NFLPA REG.] and NBPA REGULATIONS
GOVERNING PLAYER AGENTS § 4B (1986) [hereinafter NBPA REG.].
44. In Burrow v. Probus Management, Inc., No. 16840 (N.D. Ga. Aug. 9, 1973) (unpub-
lished order) the judge found that
the advice and counsel given by the Defendant... to accept all of the bonus in
one lump sum was advice not for the best interest of the Plaintiff but given for
the purpose of acquiring immediate funds for the benefit of the Defendant which
created additional tax liability in the amount of approximately twelve hundred
dollars.
Id. slip op. at 6, reprinted in J. WEISTART, supra note 38, at 321 n.709.
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ship between the agent and athlete. Once the player begins to receive the
wages negotiated under his contract, many agents, qualified or not, act as
managers or brokers to handle the athlete's financial affairs. 45 While ath-
letes may justifiably trust most agents at least to act in good faith with re-
spect to the management of finances, recent history is replete with instances
of misappropriation and mismanagement of athletes' funds.46 Moreover,
since the athlete usually possesses little or no business savvy, he may easily
be deceived by an agent's misrepresentation of the services the agent will
provide. As a result, many agents perform quite illusory income manage-
ment services and still receive fees comparable to those charged by reputable
firms that provide meaningful investment and tax counseling in connection
with athletes' dealings.47
As in any fiduciary relationship, the potential for an agent to abuse his
position is immense. Unlike many fiduciaries, however, an agent has no pro-
fessional code of ethics or state legislation that governs his conduct. Various
institutions have attempted to regulate sports agent activity, but to this point
each attempt has had its limitations.
II. ATTEMPTS AT REGULATION
A. The National Collegiate Athletic Association
The NCAA conducts an annual registration program for agents that re-
quires them both to notify a school's athletic director before contacting any
of its athletes and to refrain from participating in any activity that might
jeopardize an athlete's NCAA eligibility. 48 The major flaw in this registra-
tion program, however, is its voluntariness.49 While the organization has
the power to regulate the activities of its member institutions, it has no juris-
45. For a general discussion of financial services that agents provide athletes, see supra
notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
46. People v. Sorkin, No. 46429 (Nassau County, N.Y. Nov. 28, 1977), aff'd mem., 64
A.D.2d 680, 407 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1978) demonstrates the result of a person with no credentials
who enters the sports agent field and squanders his client's money through incompetency and
misappropriation. Richard Sorkin, a sportswriter by trade, entered the agent profession in
1971. Despite having no business, financial or legal skills, Sorkin accumulated an impressive
list of clients through contacts initiated by his brother-in-law. Incredibly, by 1975 he was
earning $415,000 a year. Sorkin assumed each of his clients' financial affairs, including paying
bills and making investments, and had their paychecks sent directly to his office. A chronic
gambler, Sorkin ultimately used his clients' money to accumulate $626,000 in gambling debts
(to which he ultimately plead guilty to grand larceny), and his poor investment skills also cost
his clients at least $271,000 in stock market losses. Montgomery, The Spectacular Rise and
Ignoble Fall of Richard Sorkin, Pro's Agent, N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1977, § 5, at 1, col. 1. See also
REPORT, supra note 2, at 74, regarding an agent who agreed to represent athletes and manage
their finances but neither paid their bills nor kept promises of off-season employment and
endorsement contracts. A subsequent inquiry of the agent turned up no discoverable assets
whereby the athletes could be reimbursed. For a discussion of other examples of misappropri-
ation and mismanagement of funds, see Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since at First It
Hasn't Succeeded Try Federal Legislation, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1035-37 (1988).
47. J. WEISTART, supra note 38, at 321.
48. NCAA Letter, supra note 4. Applications for registration with the NCAA may be
obtained by contacting the organization at Nall Avenue at 63rd Street, P.O. Box 1906, Mis-
sion, Kansas 66201, Attn: Legislative Services, or by calling (913) 384-3220.
49. Kohn, supra note 4, at 11.
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diction over the activities of sports agents. 50 Consequently, the only agents
who register with the NCAA are the ones who most likely do not need their
activities regulated.
B. Players' Unions
Under federal labor law, employee unions have the power to represent
their employees in collective bargaining and other employment agree-
ments.5 1 Unlike the NCAA, then, the respective players' associations have
the authority to screen and to regulate the activities of those seeking to rep-
resent the players in contract negotiations.52 Recognizing the need to pro-
tect their members, the NFLPA, NBPA, and Major League Baseball Players
Association (MLBPA), have all established regulations governing agents. 53
The major shortfall of these regulatory attempts lies in the fact that they
only protect athletes who are members of the union, that is, those who have
already signed professional contracts. 54 A first-year player does not become
eligible to become a member of the union until he signs a professional con-
tract, so any agent he retains to negotiate his first contract remains unregu-
lated. Since many first-year players sign multi-year contracts, they may be
in the professional league for five or six years without the benefit of union
regulation of their contracts.
These regulations are also impotent in curtailing the illegal recruitment of
college athletes, perhaps the most flagrant misconduct of agents. 55 Once
again, since these college athletes are not union members, the union regula-
tions do not afford any protection against such conduct. While these regula-
tions are certainly more effective than those promulgated by the NCAA,
they clearly are still too limited in scope and jurisdiction to satisfactorily
curb the wide range of abuses available to agents.56
C. State Legislation
Recognizing the inadequacies of the aforementioned regulatory attempts,
at least seventeen states have enacted legislation of their own aimed at con-
trolling the activities of agents.5 7 These statutes vary widely in their sub-
stance and scope, and several common problems pervade them. The states
certainly are not as limited as the NCAA and players' unions in regulating
the broad range of agent activities, but they have proven no more effective in
50. Id. at 9.
51. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1988); see also Kudla v. N.L.R.B.,
821 F.2d 95, 100 (2d Cir. 1987).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 157; Kudla, 821 F.2d at 100.
53. For a detailed discussion of the regulations imposed by the NFLPA, NBPA, and
MLBPA, see Kohn, supra note 4, at 7-9.
54, See NFLPA REG., supra note 43, § 1.
55. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
56. For a more extensive comparison of the effectiveness of the NCAA regulations and
those of the respective players associations, see Note, supra note 46, at 1041-49.
57. Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee , and
Texas have all enacted legislation.
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their attempts to curtail misconduct. The following sections study the sum
and substance of the Texas acts regulating agent activity,58 analyze the
problems associated with the statutes, and present some more realistic ap-
proaches to tackling the problem of agent misconduct.
III. THE TEXAS STATUTORY SCHEME
In 1987, Texas became the fourth state to enact legislation regulating the
activities of sports agents.59 The Texas Athlete Agent Act (Athlete Agent
Act) governs the conduct of athlete agents6 but restricts its protection to
nonprofessional athletes.61 The statute establishes a registration system for
agents, sets guidelines for contacting athletes, restricts advertising tech-
niques of agents, governs the contractual relationships between agents and
athletes, and provides both civil and criminal remedies for violations.
One month prior to the passage of the Athlete Agent Act, the state legisla-
ture passed the Violation of Collegiate Athletic Association Rules Act
(NCAA Act). 62 This Act basically adopted the NCAA rules that were in
effect on January 1, 1987, and imposed civil liability on any person who
violated a rule of that organization.63 It is unclear why this narrow rule was
not included in the regulatory scheme of the Athlete Agent Act, but that
omission forms a part of the following discussion of the far more substantive
Athlete Agent Act.
A. Registration and Renewal Requirements
Prior to directly or indirectly contacting an athlete located in the state an
agent must register with the secretary of state.64 The agent must complete
an application issued by the secretary of state and pay a fee to be deposited
58. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, §§ 1-11 (Vernon Supp. 1990); TEX. CIv.
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-.008 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
59. The Texas Athlete Agent Act became effective on October 2, 1987, but the Act did
not require agents to register or comply with the Act until January 1, 1988. TEX. REV. CiV.
STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 12(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The Texas "NCAA-Act" became effec-
tive two months prior to the Athlete Agent Act. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§§ 131.001-.008. The three states to pass legislation before Texas were California (1981),
Oklahoma (1985), and Louisiana (1987).
60. The Athlete Agent Act defines an "athlete agent" as
a person that, for compensation, directly or indirectly recruits or solicits an ath-
lete to enter into an agent contract, professional sports services contract, or fi-
nancial services contract with that person or that for a fee procures, offers,
promises, or attempts to obtain employment for an athlete with a professional
sports team.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § l(a)(2). That person who is the agent may be an
individual, company, corporation, association, partnership, or any other legal entity. Id.
§ I(a)(1).
61. The Act defines an "athlete" as an individual who resides in the state and who: a) is
eligible to participate on an intercollegiate sports team at an institution of higher education
located in the state, or b) has participated on such a team and has never signed a professional
contract. Id. § l(a)(5). The statute, therefore, does not protect professional athletes or, in the
case of baseball, high school seniors in their dealings with agents.
62. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-.008.
63. Id. §§ 131.002-.003.
64. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(a).
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in the state treasury. 65 The applicant first must provide the name and prin-
cipal business address of the individual agent or entity.66 The application
must also include the business(es) or occupation(s) that the applicant was
involved in for the five years immediately preceding the application date,67 a
description of all formal training, practical experience, and education that
relate to the activities of being an agent, 68 the names and addresses of five
professional references (if specifically requested by the secretary of state), 69
and finally, the names and addresses of all persons (except bona fide employ-
ees on stated salaries) financially interested in the operation of the business
of the agent. 70 If a corporation or partnership applies, the above informa-
tion must be provided for each officer, partner, or associate of the entity. 71
Furthermore, if the applicant intends to enter into a financial services con-
tract 72 with an athlete, the agent must furnish a $100,000 surety bond that
must be written on the secretary of state's bond form approved by the State
Board of Insurance. 73 An athlete or his representative may make a claim
against the bond to pay damages caused by reason of intentional misrepre-
sentation, fraud, deceit, or any unlawful or negligent act or omission of the
agent or his representatives while acting within the scope of the contract. 74
Once the agent satisfies the above registration requirements, the secretary
of state's office will issue a certificate of registration. The certificate remains
valid for one year from the date of issuance, although the secretary of state
may adopt a system under which certificates expire on various dates during
the year. 75 Upon expiration of the certificate, the agent may renew his regis-
tration by filing a renewal application, accompanied by the renewal fee.76
The renewal application should include both the names and addresses of all
athletes whom the agent represents at the time of renewal and the names and
addresses of all athletes whom the agent has represented during the three
65. Id. § 2(b),(e). Curiously, the statute provides for an annual renewal fee, but makes no
mention of an original registration fee to be paid by the agent. This appears to be a statutory
oversight and the secretary of state's office does, in fact, impose an initial registration fee.
Texas Application for Registration of Athlete Agent (1989) [hereinafter Texas Application].
The Act gives the secretary of state discretion in setting the fees. Id. § 2(f). While there is no
prescribed maximum limit, the secretary is required to set fees in amounts "reasonable and
necessary to cover the costs of administering this Act." Id. The registration and renewal fee is
currently set at $1,000. Texas Application, supra.
Applications for registration as an athlete agent may be obtained by contacting the secretary
of state's office at P.O. Box 12887, Austin, Texas 78711, Attn: 7 Statutory Documents, or by
calling (512) 463-5558.
66. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871 § 2(b)(1).
67. Id. § 2(b)(2).
68. Id. § 2(b)(3).
69. Id. § 2(b)(4).
70. Id. § 2(b)(5).
71. Id. § 2(c).
72. The Act defines a "financial services contract" as "any contract or agreement under
which an athlete authorizes an athlete agent to provide financial services for the athlete, in-
cluding the making and execution of investment and other financial decisions by the agent on
behalf of the athlete." Id. § l(a)(4).
73. Id. § 2(h).
74. Id.
75. Id. § 2(d).
76. Id. § 2(e).
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years preceding the date of application. 7 7
B. Permitted Contacts with Athletes
Under the Act, each college and university located in the state must spon-
sor "athlete agent interviews. ' ' 78 These interviews are to be held on each
institution's campus before the athlete's final year of intercollegiate eligibil-
ity.79 The purpose of the interviews is to discuss the agent's provision of
financial services and advice to the athlete or the agent's representation of
the athlete in the marketing of the athlete's ability or reputation.8 0 Each
institution must give at least thirty days public notice before the interview
period on campus begins and must provide written notice of the time, place,
and duration of the interview period to all agents who have previously sup-
plied the school's athletic director with their addresses.81 The interview pe-
riod must be conducted in the final year of eligibility and may not exceed
thirty consecutive days.8 2
C. Solicitation Requirements and Prohibitions
The Act does not prohibit an agent from sending an athlete any materials
relating to that agent's professional credentials or specific services,8 3 but all
forms of advertising must disclose the name and address of the agent.8 4
Within this general framework several prohibitions exist. First, the Act pro-
hibits the agent from engaging in any false, fraudulent, or misleading activi-
ties manifested through publications, promises, or representations to any
person.8 5 Second, to prevent a conflict of interest, the agent may not divide
fees with or receive compensation in any form from a professional sports
league or franchise.8 6 Third, the agent may not offer anything of value to an
employee of any college or university located in the state in return for refer-
ral of clients.8 7 Fourth, the agent may not offer anything of value, exclusive
of entertainment and travel expenses to the agent's place of business, to in-
77. Id.
78. Id. § 7(a).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. § 7(b).
82. Id. § 7(c). The member schools of the Southwest Athletic Conference have collec-
tively agreed to set an interview period from January 15th to February 1st of each year. The
state, however, has had difficulty in persuading some other major institutions in the state to
comply with this interview requirement. Telephone interview with Jim Mathieson, Staff At-
torney, Office of the Secretary of State (Oct. 10, 1989) [hereinafter Mathieson].
83. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(c). While the Act does not explicitly pro-
hibit mail solicitation, it may do so implicitly with regard to unregistered agents. Since the Act
requires that an agent be registered with the state before he contact an athlete either directly or
indirectly, it appears that an unregistered agent may violate the Act even if his entire relation-
ship with the athlete consists of sending him a brochure describing the agent's qualifications
and services performed. Id. § 2(a).
84. Id. § 6(a).
85. Id. § 6(b)(1).
86. Id. § 6(b)(2). This prohibition also extends to any representative or employee of a
professional league or franchise. Id.
87. Id. § 6(b)(3).
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duce an athlete to agree to be represented by the agent.8s Finally, except for
the school-sponsored interviews discussed in the previous subsection,8 9 the
Act prohibits an agent from directly contacting any athlete who participates
in a team sport at a college or university located in the state.90 Naturally,
therefore, the agent also may not enter into any representation agreement
with the athlete until after completion of the athlete's last intercollegiate
contest. 9 1 While the Act prevents an agent from contacting an athlete before
his eligibility has expired, it does not prohibit the athlete, or any representa-
tive on behalf of the athlete, from contacting and interviewing a prospective
agent to determine that agent's professional proficiency in certain areas.
92
D. Contracts
The agent must file with the secretary of state's office any contract he
enters into with an athlete,93 and the contract must state any fees and per-
centages to be paid by the athlete to the agent.94 Additionally, the contract
must (1) state that the agent is registered with the secretary of state, (2)
instruct the athlete not to sign the contract if it contains blank spaces or if
the athlete has not read it, and (3) include a cancellation option in favor of
the player. 95
The player has sixteen days to cancel the contract, 96 and the agent is re-
quired to file a copy of the contract with both the secretary of state and the
athletic director of the athlete's school within five days of signing.97 The
school is therefore notified before the contract becomes binding on the ath-
88. Id. § 6(b)(4).
89. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
90. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(5).
91. Id.
92. Id. § 6(c).
93. Id. § 5(c). The contract must include a schedule of fees and percentages to be paid to
the agent, as well as the services to be performed. Id. Changes in the fee schedule may be
made, but such a change will not become effective until the seventh day after the secretary of
state's office has received the change. Id.
94. Id. § 5(b).
95. Each contract must include the following statements in at least ten-point boldface
type:
NOTICE TO CLIENT
1) THIS ATHLETE AGENT IS REGISTERED WITH THE SECRETARY
OF STATE OF THE STATE OF TEXAS. REGISTRATION WITH THE
SECRETARY OF STATE DOES NOT IMPLY APPROVAL OR EN-
DORSEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE COMPE-
TENCE OF THE ATHLETE AGENT OR OF THE SPECIFIC TERMS
AND CONDITIONS OF THIS CONTRACT.
2) DO NOT SIGN THIS CONTRACT UNTIL YOU HAVE READ IT OR
IF IT CONTAINS BLANK SPACES.
3) IF YOU DECIDE THAT YOU DO NOT WISH TO PURCHASE THE
SERVICES OF THE ATHLETE AGENT, YOU MAY CANCEL THIS
CONTRACT BY NOTIFYING THE ATHLETE AGENT IN WRITING OF
YOUR DESIRE TO CANCEL THE CONTRACT NOT LATER THAN
THE 16TH DAY AFTER THE DATE ON WHICH YOU SIGN THIS
CONTRACT.
Id.
96. Id. § 5(f).
97. Id. § 5(e).
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lete, creating a check for the protection of the athlete to make certain that
the athlete knows the consequences of the contract. The cancellation option
thus allows the player to change his mind in the event that the agent pres-
sured him into signing the contract or misinformed him as to its effect.
The Act further protects the athlete from an agent attempting to take
advantage of a multi-year employment contract between the athlete and a
professional sports team. If the agent negotiates such a contract for the ath-
lete, the agent may not collect in any twelve-month period a fee that exceeds
what the athlete will receive under the contract during that same period. 98
E. Remedies for Violation
Any contract between an agent and athlete that fails to comply with the
Act becomes void. 99 Additionally, the secretary of state, upon determina-
tion that a person regulated under the Act has violated any rule adopted by
the Act, may assess a civil penalty not to exceed $10,000.100 Notwithstand-
ing the civil fine, an agent who violates either the registration require-
ments1° ' or the advertising requirements 10 2 of the Act may be subject to
several further penalties. A violation, for instance, may also subject the
agent to: (a) the forfeiture of any right of repayment by an athlete for any-
thing of value received by the athlete as an inducement to sign or while the
athlete was still a participant in intercollegiate athletics;10 3 (b) a refund of
any consideration paid to the agent on behalf of the athlete; 1°4 and (c) the
reasonable attorney's fees and court costs of an athlete who sues to recover
against an agent for a violation of the Act.105 An agent who knowingly vio-
lates either of these sections may also be criminally charged with a class A
misdemeanor. 10 6
In addition to the remedies available under the Athlete Agent Act, the
Texas NCAA Act penalizes agents who violate NCAA rules. 107 The Act
98. Id. § 5(d).
99. Id. § 8(b).
100. Id. § 9(a)-(b). If, after investigation, the secretary of state determines that a violation
has in fact occurred, the secretary must issue a preliminary report to the agent which details
the facts upon which the conclusion is based, the imposition of a civil penalty, and the amount
of the penalty. Id. § 9(c). The Act gives the agent the right to a hearing to contest the penalty
if he or she responds to the preliminary report within twenty days of the day the report was
sent. Id. § 9(d). Failure to either request a hearing or remit the amount of the penalty within
the specified time constitutes a waiver of the right to the hearing. Id. If the secretary deter-
mines at the hearing that the agent has committed the alleged violation, the secretary must
give the agent written notice of the findings established. Id. If the agent wishes to further
contest the penalty, he must, within thirty days of receipt of the notice, either pay the fine or
forward the assessed amount to the secretary for deposit into an escrow account pending judi-
cial review of the decision. Id. § 9(e). Failure to complete either of these acts within the given
time results in a waiver of all legal rights. Id. § 9(f).
101. See supra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
103. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
104. Id. § 8(a)(3).
105. Id. § 8(a)(4).
106. Id. § 8(c).
107. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 131.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990). This rule,
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creates a civil cause of action on behalf of the Southwest Athletic Conference
and member NCAA institutions against anyone who violates an NCAA
rule, holding the guilty party liable for any damages caused by the
violations. 108
The preceding summary of the Texas acts typifies the attempt by many
state legislatures to regulate the activities of sports agents. While various
states have enacted legislation that differs from the Texas acts, each such
piece of legislation, like the Texas acts, has its problems. The following sec-
tion analyzes the problem areas of the Athlete Agent Act, makes certain
proposals to augment the underlying objectives of the regulation of sports
agents, and explores possible alternative sources of regulation.
IV. ANALYSIS AND PROPOSALS
A. Jurisdictional Reach
Perhaps the greatest drawback of the Athlete Agent Act lies in its defini-
tion of what constitutes an "athlete." 10 9 Since that definition includes only
current college athletes and former college athletes who have never signed
professional contracts, the statute leaves two important groups unprotected.
The first is comprised of high school or former high school athletes who
choose to pursue professional athletic careers in lieu of attending college."l0
These athletes certainly need statutory protection as much, if not more, than
college athletes. Some of the more recent state statutes have recognized this
problem and have included language to remedy the problem."II Such a pro-
vision as an amendment to the Texas statute would be consistent with the
intent to protect naive athletes from unscrupulous agents." 2
The second group left unprotected by the Texas statute encompasses the
athletes who already have signed professional contracts. This omission is
less troubling, however, because the professional players' unions regulate the
relationship between their members and agents." 13 While this union protec-
tion ensures supervision of that relationship, the deterrent of the state's
power to impose civil and criminal penalties still does not exist with respect
to this group of athletes.
The Texas Legislature recently passed a law entitled the Texas Talent
however, does not limit liability to agents. The Act clearly extends to nonagent lawyers and
possibly even school boosters. Id. § 131.001(2).
108. Id. §§ 131.003-.004. These damages specifically include lost television revenues and
ticket sales. Id. § 131.006.
109. For the actual statutory definition of "athlete," see supra note 61.
110. Unlike football and basketball, baseball players are commonly drafted out of high
school and choose to forgo or postpone college. Likewise, nonteam sport athletes, such as
golfers or tennis players, frequently turn professional without attending college.
111. The states which currently extend protection beyond existing and former collegiate
athletes include Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Minnesota, Mississippi and Oklahoma.
112. Texas could accomplish this purpose by adopting language similar to Minnesota's
definition of "athlete." That state's definition of "student athlete" includes not only current
college athletes, but "any individual who may be eligible to engage in collegiate sports in the
future." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.2 (West Supp. 1989).
113. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
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Agency Act (Talent Act), designed to regulate the relationship between tal-
ent agencies and artists (actors, musicians, models, and the like). 1 4 The
structure of the statute is strikingly similar to that of the Athlete Agent
Act, 115 and the definition of "artist" could include professional athletes. 116
While such an interpretation would effectively regulate agent conduct with
respect to professional athletes, the agency in charge of the Talent Act has
indicated that it will not be the policy of the state to enforce the statute in
such a manner." 7 This is unfortunate, because the Talent Act is well suited
to handle the problems that a professional athlete may have with his agent,
while the Athlete Agent Act is structured primarily for the security of col-
lege athletes. Nevertheless, the legislature should amend one of the acts spe-
cifically to include in its protection the professional athlete.
B. Registration and Renewal
A fundamental deficiency in the Athlete Agent Act (and all state statutes
for that matter) is the lack of compliance with the registration requirements.
To date, Texas has only forty agents registered to do business in the state. 118
While Texas remains far ahead of any other state in its effort to register
those agents who intend to do business in the state, several agents simply
have refused to comply. Under present conditions in which the secretary of
state's office administers the Act but lacks enforcement officers, strict en-
forcement of the Act is impossible, and agents who have not complied with
the Act's registration requirements go undetected.' 19
A second problem with the registration process involves the ease with
which a person or entity may become registered. As the law currently
stands, anyone who supplies the requested information and pays the fee will
become an agent. 120 The state conducts no background checks of applicants
and requires no special training. 12 1 The fact that agents are not required to
be specially trained is one of the major problems with the industry as a
114. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 522la-9 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
115. The Talent Act contains a registration requirement with a bond provision, certain
contractual regulations, and various civil and criminal remedies available to the artist.
116. The Talent Act defines an artist in part as "any other individual who renders analo-
gous professional services in a motion picture, theatrical, radio, television, or other entertain-
ment production." TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5221a-9, § 1(H). It is arguable that an
athlete renders professional services in an entertainment production.
117. Telephone interview with Mary Baylie, Texas Department of Licensing (Oct. 10,
1989).
118. Mathieson, supra note 82. Texas, however, should be commended for its efforts in
attempting to register agents. Other states simply have been lethargic in this endeavor.
Oklahoma, for example, has no agents registered under a statute which has been in effect since
1985. Telephone interview with Brenda Coffman, Oklahoma Secretary of State's Office (Jan.
2, 1989). California, with an eight year-old statute, had only seventeen agents registered as of
early 1988. Kohn, supra note 4, at 11. Until states get serious about enforcement of the regis-
tration requirements, the state statutes will remain a non-factor in the effort to control the
dealings of agents.






whole; agents perform "professional" services, but have no professional re-
quirements or standards to which they must rise.122
Another problem with the Texas registration process lies in the surety
bond requirement. Many states require the agents to post bond,' 23 but
Texas appears to be the only state that limits the requirement to agents who
provide financial services for their clients. This approach apparently does
not consider the possibility of agents causing pecuniary damage to their cli-
ents in areas other than financial investments and money management. His-
tory had proven, however, that agent misdealing has not limited itself to the
financial services domain.1 24 The obvious solution to this problem involves
amending the statute to require all registered agents to post the bond. Fur-
thermore, Texas should consider alternative sources of security. Requiring a
trust account or cash deposit in addition to the bond would make the pro-
ceeds more readily available. Alternatively, the state, as others have done,
could require liability insurance in lieu of the surety bond. 125
Texas should also consider an exemption to the registration requirements
of the Act for any professional working within the scope of his profession. 126
This recommendation in no way proposes that attorneys or other profession-
als are not susceptible to the agent misdealing described in this Comment.
The conduct of these individuals, however, is governed by the rules and eth-
ics of their respective professional associations. Furthermore, burdensome
registration requirements act as a deterrent to these professionals entering
122. Commentators often have stated that all one needs to become an agent is a client. See
Ehrhardt, supra note 24, at 635; Kohn, supra note 4, at 1. While this adage is regrettably
accurate, no changes appear imminent. Restricting the opportunity to represent athletes to a
few selected professions (i.e., attorneys, certified financial planners) would most likely create
an unreasonable restraint on trade. However, see infra text accompanying notes 189-194, in
which the recommendation is made for a professional association of sports agents whose mem-
bership would require certain qualifications.
123. See, e.g., Alabama: ALA. CODE § 8-26-14 (Supp. 1989); California: CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 1519 (a) (West 1989); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-13 (Supp. 1989); Mississippi: Miss.
CODE ANN. § 73-41-9 (Supp. 1988); Oklahoma: OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62G (West
1989). These bond requirements range from $25,000 to $100,000 in amount and some give an
agent the option to purchase the equivalent amount of professional liability insurance.
124. The most obvious financial damage an agent can cause his client outside the realm of a
financial services contract is the charging of exorbitant fees for the agent's services. The agent
accomplishes this by contracting for and receiving an unconscionable percentage of the ath-
lete's compensation. Equally abusive is the agent who receives his percentage of an athlete's
contract up front, even though the contract does not guarantee that the athlete will receive the
full amount of the total contract. In Brown v. Woolf, 554 F. Supp. 1206, 1207-08 (S.D. Ind.
1983), for instance, an agent contracted to represent an athlete for 5% of the athlete's contract.
The athlete, however, received only 24% of his entire contract, and the agent, by receiving his
fee up front, ended up with 21% of the salary the player actually received. The Texas Act
prohibits such conduct, and a bond requirement would guarantee the payment of damages to
the athlete. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(d) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-26-14 (Supp. 1989) (may provide malpractice insurance, cer-
tificate of deposit or savings account in lieu of $50,000 bond); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 821.62(G) (West 1989) (may provide proof of liability insurance in lieu of posting $100,000
bond).
126. The Act should not require an attorney, for instance, to register under the Act if all he
does is provide his legal expertise (i.e., contract negotiation, contract draftings). Similarly, a
registered broker or certified financial planner should not be required to register if he simply
enters into a financial services contract with an athlete.
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the field. Such a result violates the underlying objective of the statute, that
of ensuring competent and ethical representation of athletes. Professionals
acting within the scope of their profession undeniably provide the most qual-
ified and skilled representation to athletes. The statute should therefore en-
courage their entry into the field, not discourage it.
One of the jurisdictional problems of the statute is the secretary's lack of
power to go beyond state borders to enforce it provisions. In order to mini-
mize this shortcoming, Texas should follow Ohio's lead by incorporating a
long-arm statute into the Act. 127 Such a provision would prevent an agent
from evading state law by bringing an athlete outside the state and secretly
signing the athlete to a representation agreement.
C. Permitted Contacts with Athletes
If administered properly, the Athlete Agent Act provides a safe and effi-
cient forum for contacts between agents and athletes. 28 Recognizing that it
would be practically impossible to absolutely prohibit agents from contact-
ing athletes before the athletes' intercollegiate eligibility has expired, the
state has permitted controlled contacts by etablishing mandatory interviews
at each institution in the state.129 While most of the major institutions in the
state have complied with this requirement, some have been uncooperative. 13
0
With interested compliance from all schools, however, this system could
benefit the interests of the agent, the athlete, and the school that the athlete
attends. 3 1
In May of 1989, state legislators proposed an amendment to the Athlete
Agent Act that would have required each school to establish a compliance
coordinator position to organize the compliance of the school with respect to
the requirements in the Texas statute. 132 Such a position could also serve as
a watchdog at the particular college or university for the illegal activity of
agents. The establishment of this position would greatly aid the secretary of
127. OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 4771.06 (Anderson Supp. 1988). The Ohio law allows a
court of that state to exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident agent as to a cause of
action arising from the agent entering into a contract with an Ohio collegian when the athlete
is outside the state. Id.
128. See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
129. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 7(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
Oklahoma has adopted the more restrictive approach of prohibiting agents from contacting
NCAA student-athletes before their NCAA eligibility expires unless the school voluntarily
sponsors on-campus interviews. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64(8) (West 1989). This
restrictive approach may be part of the reason the state has had such difficulty in convincing
agents to register under the statute. See supra note 118.
130. Mathieson, supra note 82.
131. Ideally, the agent benefits from the opportunity to sell himself to the athlete at an
early stage, the athlete benefits from the opportunity to screen agents in a controlled environ-
ment, and the school benefits by being able to closely monitor the conduct of agents with
respect to its student athletes.
132. Proposed Tex. S.B. 876, 71st Leg. (1989). The Governor vetoed the proposed bill
because it applied only to football and basketball players. The Governor felt the proposed law
should include baseball players in its definition of what constitutes an "athlete." Telephone
interview with Chuck Pauley, agent (Sept. 14, 1989). See TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art.
8871, § l(a)(5) (current definition of "athlete").
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state's office in ferreting out illegal agent activity.1 33 Unfortunately, the
Governor vetoed the bill for other unrelated reasons, but the adoption of
such an amendment would be a tremendous help to the secretary of state's
office in its efforts to administer and enforce the law.
D. Solicitation Requirements and Prohibitions
A problem common to all state regulatory schemes is the disadvantage at
which they place attorney-agents in the area of solicitation of clients. While
competent attorneys are generally well qualified agents, they are handi-
capped in the intense competition to solicit clients because the American Bar
Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct,1 34 as well as the rules of
every state bar, prohibit the solicitation of clients. As a result, attorney-
agents are forced either to give up the practice of law or to compete with
nonattorney agents at a distinct disadvantage. Therefore, attorney-agents
who wish to represent athletes and still practice law must walk a fine line
when it comes to recruiting clients.' 35
Another problem with the rules on solicitation involves the lack of a re-
quirement for the agent to disclose potential conflicts of interest that might
be present in his representation of an athlete. Certainly, an abundance of
potential conflicts may arise in a player-agent relationship.1 36 Several regu-
latory schemes have addressed the issue, though by no means in a uniform
manner. The NFLPA and the NBPA have broad provisions prohibiting
agents from engaging in any activity that creates an actual or potential con-
flict of interest with the effective representation of players. 137 The state stat-
utes, on the other hand, do not prohibit conflicts of interest in general. A
few state regulations, however, require an agent who gives investment advice
to disclose any financial interest he may have in an entity about which such
133. The schools have a bona fide interest in curbing illegal agent activity. The athletic
department of the school, therefore, is a logical place to begin the investigatory process.
134. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3 (1983).
135. Perhaps little can be done about this problem because lawyers will not lower their
standards when it comes to client solicitation. It is also highly unlikely that any regulatory
body will limit the ability of nonattorney agents to actively recruit potential clients.
136. The case of Detroit Lions, Inc. v. Argovitz, 580 F. Supp. 542 (E.D. Mich. 1984) is an
example of just one conflict that has arisen in recent years. The case involved the contract
negotiations in 1983 of former Heisman trophy winner Billy Sims. Sims was negotiating with
both the NFL Detroit Lions and the USFL Houston Gamblers when it was revealed that Sims'
agent, Jerry Argovitz, was president of the Gamblers franchise. Despite this clear conflict of
interest, Argovitz still attempted to act as Sims' agent in this bidding war. Argovitz misrepre-
sented to his client that the Lions were bargaining in bad faith and ultimately convinced Sims
to sign a contract with the Gamblers. The court ruled that Argovitz breached his fiduciary
duty by not giving the Detroit management an opportunity to better the offer Sims received
from the Gamblers. Id. at 545-49.
137. NFLPA REG., supra note 43, § 5(B)(3); NBPA REG., supra note 43, § 3(B)(g). A
particular question that is often raised with respect to conflict of interests is whether such a
conflict exists when an agent represents more than one player on the same team. Can an agent
truly act in the best interest of several players who are teammates? The NBPA has answered
that question in the affirmative. At least in professional basketball, the representation of more
than one player on the same team does not create a conflict of interest. NBPA REG., supra
note 43, § 3(B) (g).
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advice is given. 138 The inclusion in the Athlete Agent Act of a conflict of
interest provision similar to those of the NFLPA and NBPA would further
the goal of protecting the athlete and give the state another line of defense
against unethical agent behavior.
Finally, an interpretive problem recently has arisen with respect to the
offering of gifts or money as inducements for an athlete to sign a contract.1 39
Section 6(b)(4) of the Athlete Agent Act prohibits the offering of anything of
value to induce an athlete to sign a contract with an agent. 140 The Act does
not specify, however, whether the prohibition against gifts limits itself to the
athlete himself or extends to others, such as family members and friends.
The state legislature should amend this provision to make it absolutely clear
that the Act includes these individuals and any others who are in a position
of influence over the athlete.
E. Contracts
The provisions of the Athlete Agent Act governing the contracts between
agents and athletes leave much room for improvement. First, the Act allows
an agent to sign an athlete without giving prior notice to the athlete's college
or university. The benefit of prior communication of an agency contract is
that such communication would give the school adequate notice that one of
its athletes will soon be ineligible. 141 The school thus would have adequate
time either to attempt to persuade that athlete to stay in school or to remove
him from his team.
Texas should look at Georgia's approach to notice. Before signing a
Georgia athlete to an agency agreement prior to the expiration of that ath-
lete's eligibility, an agent must notify the Georgia Athlete Agent Regulatory
Commission, which in turn notifies the athlete's school.142 The agent may
then sign the athlete to the contract thirty days after the Commission has
received notice. 143 Such a statute provides a much more direct and effective
method of protecting not only the school but also the athlete. 144
138. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-26-31 (Supp. 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1535.7 (West 1989).
139. Agent Johnny Rodgers recently admitted giving a fur coat and other items to the
mother of University of Houston quarterback Andre Ware in an attempt to induce Ware to
sign a representation agreement. The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 28, 1989, at 6B, col. 1. The
Secretary of State has taken the position that this gift is a violation of § 6(b)(4) of the Athlete
Agent Act, which prohibits an agent from giving anything of value in an attempt to lure an
athlete into signing a contract. Id. Rodgers, on the other hand, did not believe that his contact
with Mrs. Ware violated the Act. Id.
140. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
141. As the Texas law currently stands, an agent must file a copy of the contract with the
school's athletic director within five days of the signing of the contract. Id. § 5(e). It is true
that the athlete has fifteen days to cancel the contract, thereby giving him at least ten days to
cancel after the school is notified, but many problems may still arise. For instance, if the
player participates in an NCAA contest between the time he signed the contract and the
school's notice of such contract, both the player and the school are in violation of NCAA
rules. Such a predicament carries a civil penalty in Texas. TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE
ANN. §§ 131.002-.003 (Vernon Supp. 1990).
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A016(a) (Supp. 1989).
143. Id.
144. The benefit to the athlete comes in the form of adequate time to seek outside in-
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One shortfall of both Texas and Georgia schemes, however, lies in the fact
that both statutes place no corresponding burden of notification on the ath-
lete. Conversely, Tennessee requires both the agent and the athlete to give
notice of an agency contract to the school within seventy-two hours of the
execution of the agreement. 145 By requiring both parties to the agreement to
give notice, the school has a double layer of protection from the liabilities
that may arise from playing an ineligible player.
To further encourage notice, especially from the agent, Tennessee gives
the athlete the right to rescind the agreement within twenty days of the sign-
ing of the contract, or the receipt of the contract by the athlete's school, or,
if no notification is given, the date that the athlete's eligibility expires.146
The statute tolls the twenty-day rescission period until the last of these three
events occurs. 147 The agent, therefore, has a genuine interest in providing
notice of any agreement to the school in order to prevent the athlete from
being able to rescind the contract long after he signs it. A similar provision
in Texas would simply require a small amendment to section 5(f) of the
Athlete Agent Act.14 8
A second problem arises with respect to the mandatory contractual provi-
sion imposed by the statute.' 49 The three-part notice required in all agency
contracts under the Act certainly provides a sound basis for ensuring that
the athlete is not mislead into signing an agreement.150 The required lan-
guage omits, however, a notice to the athlete that his participation in the
agreement will jeopardize his amateur standing. 151 While the Act does give
the secretary of state discretion to reject any contract form presented, 152 the
secretary would not likely disapprove a contract solely on this basis. 153
Nevertheless, public policy and the inherent naivete of youth dictate that an
dependent counsel to review the agency agreement for fairness. Historically, athletes who
have entered into premature agency agreements have been without this benefit because of the
secretive nature of the dealings and the risk of losing their college eligibility. This atmosphere
resulted in unconscionable agreements in favor of the agent. See Ehrhardt, supra note 24, at
654. The thirty-day waiting period in Georgia, however, allows the athlete to equalize the
negotiation with the agent by seeking a competent third party to review the agency agreement.
145. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2104(b)(4) (Supp. 1989).
146. Id. § 49-7-2104(b)(5)(A)(i)-(iii).
147. Id.
148. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(e) (Vernon Supp. 1990). Section
5(f)(1) could read: Within twenty days of the last of the following to occur, the athlete shall
have the right to rescind the contract or any contractual relationship with the agent by giving
notice in writing to the agent of his intent to rescind: (a) date on which the contractual rela-
tionship between the athlete and agent; (b) notification, as provided in subsection 5(e), of such
contractual relationship is received by the athlete director of the athlete's institution; or (c) if
such notice as required in subsection 5(e) is not given, expiration of the eligibility of the ath-
lete. (2) The athlete may not, under any circumstances effect a waiver of the right to rescind.
149. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
150. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
151. Both the Alabama and California statutes include such a provision. ALA. CODE §§ 8-
26-22 to -23 (Supp. 1989); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1530.5 (West 1989).
152. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(a) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
153. The fact that the statute explicitly provides the mandatory contractual provisions nul-
lifies any argument that the omission of an amateur standing warning is sufficient to void the




amateur standing warning should be a conspicuous element of every agree-
ment an agent enters into with any amateur athlete.' 54
Tennessee has gone one step further and requires a provision in the agency
agreement that puts an athlete on notice that his school and teammates
could be adversely affected if he signs the contract. 5 5 If an athlete signs
early, he not only forfeits his own eligibility, but also may force his school to
forfeit games and miss post-season bowl and tournament opportunities. At
least at the NCAA Division I level, this could cost schools several million
dollars. 156
F. Remedies for Violations
Certainly the most difficult task of the secretary of state's office lies in
discovering violations of the statute. 157 As mentioned earlier, the secretary
of state oversees an administrative agency not equipped with the resources to
154. An amateur standing warning could fit into the Athlete Agent Act with the other
warnings under § 5(b) as subsection (4). Section 5(b) already requires the language to be in
ten-point, bold-face type. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5b. For text of present
warnings, see supra note 94.
155. TENN. CODE. ANN. § 49-7-2104(b)(2) (Supp. 1989). The following statement must
appear in at least ten-point boldface type: "IF YOU SIGN THIS CONTRACT PRIOR TO
YOUR LAST INTERCOLLEGIATE GAME AND DO NOT NOTIFY YOUR COLLEGE
OR UNIVERSITY OF THIS CONTRACT, YOUR TEAM MAY BE REQUIRED TO
FORFEIT ALL GAMES IN WHICH YOU PARTICIPATE THEREAFTER, AND YOU
MAY CAUSE YOUR TEAM TO BE INELIGIBLE FOR POST SEASON GAMES." Id.
Consistent with the recommendation in supra note 154 this provision could be included in the
Athlete Agent Act as § 5(b)(5).
156. For instance, if a violation forced a school to miss the 1990 Rose Bowl, that school
would lose a $5.5 million payout for its participation in the game. The Dallas Morning News,
Dec. 31, 1989, at 16B, col. 4. In 1988, the University of Alabama was forced to return the over
$250,000 that the school had earned in the 1987 NCAA basketball tournament because two of
its players had signed early with Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom. Atlanta Const., May 10,
1988, at IE, col. 2. For a discussion of the case, see Ehrhardt, supra note 24, at 644-45.
157. In spite of the lack of investigatory and enforcement resources needed to properly
administer the Act, Texas nevertheless recently became the first state to actually impose the
maximum civil fine available under the statute on an agent. In December of 1989, the secre-
tary of state's office fined former Heisman Trophy winner Johnny Rodgers and the sports
marketing firm he represents, TEAM America, Inc., $10,000 for alleged violations of the con-
tacts provision of the Act. The Dallas Morning News, Dec. 28, 1989, at 6B, col. 1. Rodgers
allegedly prematurely met with the 1989 Heisman winner, University of Houston quarterback
Andre Ware, and offered Ware $20 million to sign a representation agreement. Furthermore,
Rodgers admitted buying Ware's mother a fur coat and other items in an attempt to lure Ware
into signing a contract.
Notwithstanding the Rodgers incident, however, the secretary of state has taken disciplinary
action against only two other agents since the Act was promulgated in 1987. Mathieson, supra
note 82. The first action was taken against an agent who merely overlooked renewal of his
registration. Id. The agent continued to file his contracts with the secretary's office, but did
not file a renewal application. This violation required little investigation since the agent was
already on file and actively trying to comply with the statutory requirements.
The second violation involved a California agent who failed to meet the registration require-
ments of the Act before contacting an athlete within the state. Id. The secretary of state felt
that the agent was acting in good faith and simply was not aware of the Texas law. The state
fined both agents $250 for their violations.
Ironically, two of the three penalties' that have been imposed under the Act have been
against agents acting in good faith and trying to comply with the various requirements of the
various states. Because of the difficulties in enforcement, Texas has only once penalized an
agent engaged in the type of conduct that the statute was designed to prevent.
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actively seek out and investigate the misconduct of agents. 158 As a result,
the office has to rely primarily on assistance from outside sources in report-
ing any violations.
The major problem with the above situation is that a party privy to the
illegal conduct of an agent would rarely be interested in reporting the viola-
tion. 159 The system currently views the athlete as the victim, and unless that
athlete becomes disenchanted with the deal he receives from his agent, he
has no interest in reporting an illegal contract that he may have executed. 160
While the athlete's institution may have a genuine pecuniary interest in re-
porting agent violations of the statute, the difficulty still remains that rarely
does anyone associated with the institution know that an illegal contract has
been signed.
It seems that the time has come to establish a means to deter both the
agent and the player from engaging in illegal conduct. t 61 Experience has
shown that athletes are not as innocent or naive as the Act seems to imply.
By imposing civil or criminal penalties on athletes who knowingly deal with
agents in violation of NCAA rules and state law, the state would provide
another wall of protection to its attempt to curb illegal agent activity. Thus,
in order to execute a premature agency contract, both the agent and the
athlete would have to be willing to break the law. Perhaps the threat of
criminal liability would cause the athlete to think again before accepting fi-
nancial inducements and entering into an illegal contract. 162 Furthermore,
158. See supra notes 118-119 and accompanying text.
159. The authors drafted the statute with the idea that the athlete is the victim. Mathieson,
supra note 82. As a result of this mindset, the state levels all penalties against the agent, and
the athlete keeps any perquisites which he accumulated during the relationship. TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(a)(2) (Vernon Supp. 1990). The apparent rationale is that if
the state allows the athlete to keep the money, he will be more likely to come forth and incrim-
inate the agent. A couple of fallacies exist in this reasoning, however. First, most athletes are
not disenchanted with their agents. On the contrary, athletes who have received gifts and
inducements from their agents to sign should be extremely satisfied and look forward to a
continuing relationship with their agent. Second, the athlete who enters into a premature
agency contract does not want to lose the remainder of his college eligibility. The only way to
enjoy the benefit of his bargain and continue to participate at the collegiate level is to keep his
contract with the agent confidential.
160. On the contrary, the athlete has a legitimate interest in keeping any agreement be-
tween the two secret, because disclosure would jeopardize the athlete's college eligibility and
subject his agent to the various penalties discussed in this Comment. See supra notes 99-108
and accompanying text.
161. In recognizing that many state statutes have given the athlete a free ride when it
comes to regulatory schemes, the Florida legislature recently enacted a statute that holds the
athletes responsible for their own actions in dealing with agents. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 468.451-.454 (West 1989). In many cases, the college athlete is as guilty of misconduct as
the agent. Certainly, college athletes know the NCAA rules as well or better than the sports
agents who recruit them. "Yet, like the agent, the athletes ignore those rules, their scholarship
commitment to their university, and, in some instances, state law, to satisfy their monetary
appetites." Ehrhardt, supra note 24, at 673. Florida, therefore, prescribes criminal sanctions
not only against the agent for a violation of state law, but also the athlete. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 468.454(1) (first degree misdemeanor for athlete failing to provide timely notice of agency
contract to institution).
162. One may argue that if an athlete is willing to secretly sign an agency contract in
violation of NCAA rules, he may be equally willing to risk a possible misdemeanor charge.
However, risking college eligibility on the one hand, and being charged with a crime on the
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if the statute required the athlete to forfeit any money he received as an
inducement in violation of state law, he would be less willing to risk his
eligibility through accepting such an incentive or entering into a premature
agreement. 163
Since enforcement of the Act remains so difficult for the secretary of
state, 164 an alternative means to increase compliance is to raise the penalty
for violation of the law. Under the Athlete Agent Act, the maximum civil
penalty is currently $10,000.165 Since the percentage that an agent receives
of an athlete's contract in many cases far exceeds this amount, the legislature
should increase the maximum penalty to compel agents to reconsider before
blatantly violating the statute. 166 The current statute also carries a criminal
penalty in the form of a class A misdemeanor. 167 This penalty should also
be strengthened to a felony, with possible prison time involved for the most
blatant abuses. 168 Furthermore, consistent with the recommendation of
holding the athletes as well as the agents accountable under the statute, 169
civil and criminal penalties against the athlete would lend to the statute the
added potency needed for compliance. 170
Even with the enhanced penalties for violation, however, the likelihood of
illegal behavior being detected remains minimal without active enforcement
of the Act. One viable alternative to increase the enforceability of the Act is
to involve the state attorney general in the investigation and prosecution of
violations. Another means of accomplishing the same purpose is to create a
special enforcement arm under the supervision of the secretary of state,
funded by a tax on all agent transactions.
other are two very different matters. It seems the possibility of having a criminal record would
be a far more effective deterrent than missing a few games during one's senior year of college.
163. This argument ends in a polycentric decision, however, with the answer depending on
where one wishes to place the risk of loss. If the Act does not allow the athlete to keep the
money paid to him as an illegal inducement, then it would be returned to the agent, who paid it
as an illegal inducement in the first place. While this may deter the athlete, it encourages the
agent to offer such inducements because he knows that if there is a problem, he will get the
money back. On the other hand, if the Act allows the athlete to keep the money, he will be
encouraged to accept inducements from an agent and possibly even seek out the most lucrative
deal he can muster, knowing that the risk of loss is on the agent.
164. See supra notes 157-160 and accompanying text.
165. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 9(b) (Vernon Supp. 1990).
166. Perhaps the $10,000 fine imposed on Johnny Rodgers and TEAM America, Inc. last
December will catch the attention of agents who previously took this part of the statute lightly.
See supra note 157. If the maximum penalty were $50,000, however, even more of a deterrent
would exist.
167. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(c).
168. Such a suggestion is certainly not out of the ordinary in light of several recent statutes:
ALA. CODE § 8-26-41 (1989 Supp.) (violation of a felony, punishable by fine of not more than
$5,000 and imprisonment from one to ten years); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.453(3) (West 1989)
(violation of a third degree felony, punishable by fine of $5,000 and imprisonment for up to five
years); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4(1)-(2) (Burns 1989) (violation of a class D felony, punish-
able by fine of not more than $10,000 and imprisonment for fixed term of two years).
169. See supra notes 161-163 and accompanying text.
170. Even if a state rarely enforced such sanctions, the possibility of enforcement might put
enough fear into the athlete to prevent him from illegally signing with an agent until his eligi-
bility has expired. The practical effect of such an inclusion would be far more productive than
the actual words themselves.
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In many cases the athlete's school becomes the only real victim of a pre-
mature agency agreement, since it may not only lose a star athlete but also,
more significantly, lose substantial television and post-season revenue. 17 1
Therefore, a cause of action on behalf of these schools for the recovery of
damages caused by an agent should be an essential part of any statutory
scheme. While the Texas NCAA Act creates such a cause of action for any
agent that breaks NCAA rules, 172 the scope of that statute should be ex-
panded to include damages incurred by the institution as a result of any
violation of the Athlete Agent Act. Furthermore, to promote statutory effi-
ciency, this new provision should be contained in the Athlete Agent Act,
and the Texas NCAA Act should be repealed. In a provision similar to the
one suggested, Tennessee expressly defines possible damages as lost revenues
from television appearances, ticket sales, and participation in post-season
tournaments or bowl games. 173
V. THE ALTERNATIVE OF FEDERAL REGULATION
A. History
The option of federal regulation has been suggested more than once. 174
The obvious question that Congress must answer before considering various
proposals for federal attention is whether this area involves a matter of fed-
eral concern. As early as thirteen years ago members of Congress recog-
nized that sports are of such importance to the nation that some form of
congressional oversight on an ongoing, permanent basis is required. 175 At
that time, however, a House Select Committee conducting an inquiry into
professional sports examined the role played by agents in the sports industry
and determined that the examples of malpractice were insufficient to base
any recommendation for legislation. 176 The Committee did suggest that a
successor committee be formed to investigate the matter more thor-
171. See supra note 156.
172. See supra text accompanying note 108.
173. TENN CODE. ANN. § 49-7-2106 (Supp. 1989). Furthermore, the Tennessee Act al-
lows treble damages in an amount equal to three times the value of the athletic scholarship that
the school provided the athlete. Id. § 49-7-2107.
174. See, e.g., Kohn, supra note 4, at 13-16 (suggestion for certification through instruc-
tional programs and testing); Note, supra note 46, at 1064-69 (recommendation for preemptive
federal statute similar to the proposed Professional Sports Agency Act of 1985).
175. 122 CONG. REC. 34,049 (1976) (statement of Rep. Sisk, chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Professional Sports). Rep. Sisk remarked:
Congress has a duty to protect the fan interest of this Nation in its sports.
Sports provide entertainment and recreation. They are supportive of our Na-
tion's traditional values of sportsmanship and fair play. They are a national
asset. If congressional oversight can serve as a conscience for the American
sports world, keeping the eyes of those who run sports in America on its impor-
tant national goal, they have in their care: spiritual and physical integrity, then
this is a task we should seriously look into and take on if necessary.
Id. at 34,049-50.
176. REPORT, supra note 2, at 77. That inquiry took place, however, before the real abuse
began. One questions whether Congress would reach the same conclusion today, in the wake




oughly. 17 7 In light of the scandals that have compromised the integrity of
the entire sports industry in the past few years, perhaps now is the time for
Congress finally to involve itself.
B. Rationales for Federal Regulation
The rationales for federal regulation are quite compelling. First, the
sports agent profession clearly involves interstate activities, 178 and activities
that affect interstate commerce are routinely regulated by Congress through
its power granted under the commerce clause of the Constitution. 179 Sec-
ond, federal regulation would create uniformity, a trait the present system
lacks. As more states enact legislation, the process of registration and com-
pliance will become ever more burdensome on the individual agent.180 The
prospect of requiring agents to register only once and pay a single fee should
be appealing even to those agents who otherwise oppose federal regula-
tion. 181 Third, the question has been raised as to whether these state statutes
violate the dormant commerce clause, which blocks a state from regulating
in a way that would materially burden or discriminate against interstate
commerce. 182 Because of the intrinsically interstate nature of this business,
a state statute would have to pass the often cited Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc. 183 balancing test to be upheld. Though certainly skewed towards con-
stitutionality, this test balances the legitimate local interest advanced by the
statute with the burden it places on interstate commerce. 184 If, for example,
177. REPORT, supra note 2, at 78. Congress never established this successor committee.
Thus, as the incidence of agent abuse has increased during the 1980's, no congressional over-
sight has been present to "serve as a conscience for the American sports world." See supra
note 175. The lack of congressional interest manifested itself again in 1985 when the National
Sports Lawyers Association drafted a proposed federal statute, The Professional Sports
Agency Act of 1985, but was unable to find a sponsor for the bill. The organization is still
feeling out Congress to determine the proper time, place, and source of introduction of the bill.
Kohn, supra note 4, at 14.
178. REPORT, supra note 2, at 79. The fact that the entire professional sports industry is
interstate in nature is evidenced by the fact that no professional sports league has more than
four teams from any single state; four Major League Baseball organizations domicile in Cali-
fornia-the California Angels, Los Angeles Dodgers, Oakland Athletics and San Francisco
Giants. Agents, then, not only engage in interstate commerce when recruiting athletes from
the colleges and universities of the various states, but also when negotiating contracts with
various teams from around the league.
179. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.3.
180. It is not unreasonable to believe that several states will enact their own statutes in the
near future. In 1988 alone, twelve states passed legislation regulating various activities of
sports agents. These states were Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Maryland, Mich-
igan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Ohio, Pennsylvania and Tennessee. Arizona, Massachusetts, Ne-
braska, New Hampshire, New York, South Carolina, Vermont and Washington all have
considered similar legislation or have legislation pending.
181. An argument may be made that the lack of compliance with state regulations is a
function of the burden created by the registration requirements of each state. To comply with
the registration requirements of every state would effectively price many agents out of the
market, thereby reducing the field of qualified agents from which an athlete might like to
choose.
182. Rodgers, States Revamp Defense Against Agents, THE SPORTS LAWYER, Winter
1988-89, at 1, 7.
183. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
184. The test is enunciated as follows: "Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effec-
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a court found that the burden of the registration and bond requirements of a
certain state outweighed the local interest of regulation, then it would strike
the state statute down as unconstitutional.1 8 5 Although no agent has judi-
cially challenged a state statute to date, the legal community should keep
this consideration in mind since this confrontation is certain to take place at
some point in the future. Finally, preemptive federal regulation would pro-
vide the effectiveness and enforcement authority that the state statutes cur-
rently lack. 18 6 The federal government has a greater pool of resources from
which to extract investigatory and enforcement mechanisms. Furthermore,
federal legislation carries with it a greater air of deterrence than any state
statute might provide.1 8 7
C. Recommendations for Federal Legislation
Eight years ago, the National Sports Lawyers Association (NSLA) drafted
a proposed federal statute entitled the Professional Sports Agency Act of
1985 (PSAA) to regulate the activities of sports agents. 1 8 8 That organization
recognized the need for federal legislation and sought to find a sponsor for
the bill in Congress. Unfortunately, the proposed bill was never formally
introduced due to a lack of congressional interest. 189 In light of the path the
industry has taken in recent years, however, it is time for Congress at least to
reconsider some form of federal legislation.
Although the PSAA is by no means perfect, it does provide a solid foun-
dation for regulation by requiring all agents to become members of a na-
tional sports agency association approved by and registered with the
Secretary of Commerce (Secretary).1 90 The Act also requires the agent to
meet certain standards of training, experience, and competence set by the
Secretary and the association to which the agent applies. 19 1 Though not
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only inciden-
tal, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in
relation to the putative local benefits." Id.
185. Such a scenario would only be likely when an agent had minimum contacts, such as
mere contact with an athlete, in a state that imposes a heavy burden through egregious regis-
tration or bonding requirements.
186. A fundamental reason for the lack of effectiveness and perceived enforcement author-
ity of state regulations is that the sports agent profession is truly national in scope. At least
one commentator has likened the agent-athlete relationship to that of a stockbroker-client,
which has been federally regulated since 1934. See Note, supra note 46, at 1066-67; Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988).
187. Agent Mike Trope enunciated this view when he stated that he will ignore NCAA
regulations unless they are "laws of the United States, and you can go to prison for ten years if
you break them." McLeese, A Whole New Ballgame for Lawyers, STUDENT LAW., Oct. 1980,
at 46.
188. Professional Sports Agency Act of 1985 (1985) [hereinafter PSAA] (drafted by the
National Sports Lawyers Association and yet to be introduced before Congress).
189. Kohn, supra note 4, at 14.
190. PSAA, supra note 188, § 6(b). "National sports agency association means any associ-
ation of sports agents which has been approved by and registered with the Secretary as a
national sports agency association." Id. § 3(5).
191. Id. § 6(c)(1). Such a measure would eliminate the biggest complaint about agents,
that they may be certified without any minimum level of expertise in, or knowledge relating to,
representing or advising athletes.
1116 [Vol. 43
required by the PSAA, such standards should require applicants to pass an
examination before registration is granted.' 92 This examination should be
administered by the players' associations of the individual sports and should
test the applicant's proficiency in a wide array of matters concerning the
rules and procedures of each league. 193 Generally, the agent should be able
to demonstrate a knowledge of tax laws and principles of finance to ensure
he possesses the competence to negotiate adequate compensation packages.
Specific topics that should be covered by such testing include the constitu-
tions, bylaws, and amateur draft procedures of the professional leagues to
which the agent has applied. Furthermore, the agent should be aware of the
collective bargaining agreements, waiver procedures, and free agency sys-
tems currently in effect. 194 The examination should also test the agent's un-
derstanding of the fundamental rules of the sports, as well as the significance
of individual statistics in the negotiation of the agent's salary and bonus
clauses. 195 The various professional players' associations should administer
these tests and should follow them with mandatory continuing education
seminars, similar to the continuing legal education credits attorneys must
accumulate.' 96 These recommendations will ensure that agents are ade-
quately qualified and current in their knowledge of the various issues impor-
tant to the representation of professional athletes.
In addition to the above registration and testing requirements, the pro-
posed regulatory scheme should protect all athletes, whether or not they
have signed a professional contract. It should also impose severe civil and
criminal sanctions on an agent who violates one of its provisions. Further-
more, any federal legislation should include the various contacts, solicita-
tion, and contractual provisions recommended in the previous section for the
Texas Athlete Agent Act. A federal statute of the type recommended here
would serve the purpose of protecting all athletes (professional or not) and
all schools from the problems discussed in this Comment.
D. Compromise: Model Sports Agency Act
Since Congress has yet to display a serious interest in regulating the sports
industry, the creation of a uniform Model Sports Agency Act (Model Act)
might be a viable compromise between the current inconsistent state regula-
tions and the expansive proposed federal scheme. Much like the Uniform
Securities Act, a Model Sports Agency Act would promote uniformity
among the states, but still allow each state a choice to adopt certain provi-
sions it deemed necessary. Such a system, however, would not ease the bur-
192. See generally Kohn, supra note 4, at 14-15. Section (6)(c)(2) of the PSAA gives the
Secretary and the individual association discretion whether to test applicants.
193. See generally Kohn, supra note 4, at 15 (recommendation for comprehensive program
involving mandatory instructional seminars and extensive testing).
194. For a general treatise discussing these issues in professional sports, see SPORTS LAW,
supra note 8.
195. Kohn, supra note 4, at 15.
196. The registration, testing, and continuing education requirements could be funded
through the penalties assessed under the Act, as well as fees charged to prospective and current
members of the associations.
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den of having to register in several states unless it contained a reciprocity
agreement among the states. Such an agreement could require an agent to
register and post bond in one state, but allow him to do business in other
states, with the agreement that the registration and bond cover his conduct
in all states in which he is doing business. If the states have adopted the
Model Act or something substantially similar, the agent would know what
to expect, and few problems would exist with respect to administration and
reciprocity. In any event, the substance of the Model Act should be similar
to that suggested for the state and federal legislation in this Comment.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The professional sports industry exists as an entertainment and relaxation
medium to millions of Americans. It unites entire cities, teaching the value
of teamwork and unity. It is truly a national asset.
Without a doubt, the industry has received a black eye in recent years as a
result of both the incompetence and unscrupulousness of sports agents.
While many entities have tried to cure the ills caused by agent activities,
none has yet found an effective panacea. Federal regulation certainly seems
the most workable solution, especially if it incorporates measures similar to
those suggested in this Comment. Until members of Congress display an
interest in regulation, however, that alternative remains illusory.
State legislation, while certainly not as efficient as federal regulation, could
effectively produce the desired result of protection to both the athlete and his
school if the states were willing to execute the laws they have enacted. The
burden of registration and lack of uniformity, however, would still remain.
Nevertheless, until the states enforce their registration requirements and al-
locate the necessary resources to investigate and prosecute agents who do
not comply, their statutes will continue to be ignored by most agents.
A Model Act would achieve most of the goals of federal regulation, but
still leave the ultimate regulatory power in the states. Perhaps this is the
most likely alternative in view of the recent congressional affinity for deregu-
lation. To be feasible, however, such a system would require the cooperation
of all states in enacting the Model Act and enforcing it in a uniform manner.
Regardless of how it is accomplished, one thing remains clear: the time
has come for someone to take the lead in sports agent regulation. The future
and integrity of American sports are at stake.
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